THE right of state authorities to board ships on the high seas has been in the spotlight of late with the recent case of the MV Raider (IMO 9032824).
In a joint French-US operation in January 2026, authorities boarded the Togo-flagged vessel in international waters off French Polynesia and seized the contraband.
The five tonnes of drugs were later dumped at sea (a whole different environmental controversy for another time). The ship and its crew were released and allowed to continue their voyage, triggering questions across the Pacific about the lawfulness of the operation and who had the right—and the obligation—to prosecute those involved.
The ship was expected to continue its voyage to Sydney, however, tracking data reports the vessel is now bound for Noumea in French Caledonia.
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ships on the high seas are governed by the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction. Beyond its territorial seas, the coastal state has very limited authority.
The Raider was intercepted in international waters, beyond the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone of French Polynesia. That immediately limited France’s legal authority. Absent flag state consent, UNCLOS permits boarding on the high seas only in narrowly defined circumstances, including piracy, slave trading, unauthorised broadcasting or where a vessel is stateless.
Drug trafficking, despite its global opprobrium, is not among those automatic exceptions. UNCLOS obliges all states to cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs by ships on the high seas. However, the onus is on the flag state to request assistance and coastal states are not given intervention powers.
In practice, many drug interdictions rely on bilateral or multilateral agreements allowing boarding with flag state consent after the fact. Reports at the time of the interception of the Raider indicated that the French sought, but were denied, the approval of the Togo authorities to seize the vessel and arrest the crew.
This will not enhance the reputation of Togo's privatised International Registration Bureau. The Togo flag is classified by the ITF and others as a "flag of convenience" and is often blacklisted under the Paris and Tokyo MOUs.
The other consequence of Togo's withholding of approval may be that the seizure was unlawful. France had no unilateral right to interfere with the vessel on the high seas.
The case has drawn parallels with US drug enforcement measures closer to home. Since late 2025, the United States has carried out multiple lethal strikes against vessels it claims were engaged in drug trafficking linked to Venezuelan criminal groups. In several cases, suspected “drug boats” were destroyed and those on board killed by military force rather than being boarded.
Another parallel is the interception of the Freedom Flotilla in the eastern Mediterranean high seas by Israel and the arrest of those on board, widely regarded as a breach of international law.
Neither the US nor Israel are parties to UNCLOS, although the US at least has a stated policy of acting in a manner consistent with its provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans.
US officials have justified their strikes by designating certain cartels as terrorist organisations and framing drug trafficking as a national security threat. Israel also seeks to justify its actions on security grounds, but the weight of international legal opinion is against both sets of actions.
Coastal states do have enhanced enforcement powers within their territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles) and limited rights in their contiguous zones (the 12 nautical miles beyond the territorial sea) and EEZ, particularly relating to customs, economic exploitation and security.
However, the Raider was intercepted beyond those maritime zones, placing it outside the scope of those coastal enforcement powers.
French Polynesian authorities later confirmed that overcrowded prisons and jurisdictional complexity were factors in the decision not to prosecute locally, with responsibility effectively deferred to either the Flag State or the destination country.
That decision had the added advantage of avoiding a potentially difficult and embarrassing examination of the lawfulness of the boarding, seizure and arrests.
While the French interception and cargo destruction in the Raider case might be legally dubious, the operation otherwise respected UNCLOS in that, in the absence of flag state approval, the vessel and crew were released.
Contrast this with the US actions against Venezuelan vessels which many regard as constituting extra-judicial assassinations on the high seas. Similarly with Israel's actions against the Flotilla, which have been described as breaches of international law norms.
It is widely recognised that the rules-based international order is under threat. If coastal states start ignoring established international law norms and UN conventions, global maritime trade and security may be substantially undermined. In a different context, China's action in the South China Sea is another example of a state flouting international law in the pursuit of its own territorial ambitions.
UNCLOS provides a stable, predictable and fair regime for the regulation of maritime jurisdiction, rights and obligations.
Australia is heavily dependent on secure sea lanes.
Our security and prosperity are bound with the common adherence to UNCLOS and the other elements of international law. Adherence to that framework is not of merely theoretical importance. It underpins our regional relationships, limits unilateral overreach and ensures that enforcement at sea remains rule based rather than self-interested.
The seizure of five tonnes of cocaine has attracted interest but not a great deal of criticism. Yet the Raider incident may be seen as the thin end of a jurisdictional wedge that has the capacity to split open the orderly conduct of trade on the high seas.