AUSTRALIA’S prosperity and national defence is fundamentally dependent on the security of sea routes abroad — yet it does not have a national maritime strategy.
That was the observation made by the University of NSW (Canberra) Naval Studies Group on the release of its Australian Maritime Strategy 2035 (AMS 2035) as a monograph on Tuesday (4 November).
Australia is a “vast, resource-rich island nation with the world’s third-largest exclusive economic zone and near total-reliance on sea trade and undersea communications,” AMS 2035 notes. “These advantages of distance and size are simultaneously vulnerabilities, exposing Australia to disruption of critical trade and supply chains.”
Those disruptions are already evident, with recent examples of China’s “coercive behaviour” and the “increasing uncertainty of US policy”, creating the “most contested maritime environment since the Cold War”.
Highlighting Australia’s vulnerability to import disruption, AMS 2035 observes that the nation ranks 99 — between Morocco (above) and Laos — out of 145 countries in the Harvard Economic Complexity Index.
Just two oil refineries remain in Australia — leaving less than 30 days fuel supply after a complete import disruption — and the country imports virtually all microprocessors and medical personal protective equipment, more than 90 per cent of medicines and even 50 per cent of fertiliser products.
To shore up Australia’s economic and defence maritime security, AMS 2035 outlines a whole-of-nation strategy built on three “enduring objectives”: deterrence, sea control and presence.
Deterrence is underpinned by the future nuclear-powered submarine capability now committed but new subs under the AUKUS pact need to be “supported by balanced surface combatant task groups, mine warfare and uncrewed systems, and enhanced replenishment and strategic lift”.
The UNSW Naval Studies Group was concerned that Royal Australian Navy vessels were required to undertake “constabulary” functions while mine countermeasure forces (including Clearance Diving Teams) had been run down to a “nominal capability”.
Sea power was not just about freedom of navigation and manoeuvre for the ADF but also to protect “Australia’s lifeline maritime trade and critical undersea infrastructure including cables and pipelines”.
The “presence” objective is supported by undertaking regular naval deployments to Southeast Asia and the Pacific “to reassure partners, shape the regional environment and demonstrate commitment to the rules-based order”.
The 15 recommendations contained in AMS 2035 include a comprehensive and independent costing of AUKUS Pillar 1 “as a matter of urgency” to enable a recalibration of long-term overall Defence funding requirements.
The strategy proposes standardisation of ship designs and systems and the expansion of local supply chains.
To deal with illegal fishing, seaborne drug traffic and people smugglers, AMS 2035 suggests consideration of either the transfer of RAN offshore patrol boats to Border Force or the establishment of an Australian Coast Guard “to rationalise constabulary tasks and expand the mariner pool”.
To protect maritime infrastructure, the strategy urges a scoping study on security of undersea cables and other fixtures with whole-of-government, industry and international input.
“Australia faces a volatile and dangerous maritime environment that demands a coherent, durable maritime strategy able to integrate government, defence, and industry to safeguard its lifelines and help shape regional stability,” AMS 2035 notes.