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Report highlights equipment failures in global fleet

Written by Caroline Tung | May 8, 2026 2:35:01 AM

A REPORT detailing “critical and recurring equipment failure points” within ships across the world has been released by the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS). 

The report followed a research campaign, Concentrated Inspection Campaign on Emergency Power Supply Tests on Ships, conducted between 1 January and 31 December 2025, which was carried out in response to concerns raised by the Tokyo MoU regarding testing procedure risks. 

IACS secretary general Robert Ashdown said the campaign delivered “robust and detailed data insights” across the global fleet. 

“We are grateful to our members for their close engagement and support for this concentrated inspection campaign, which was prompted by a warning from the Tokyo MoU about potential risks in the testing of emergency power systems that may not meet SOLAS standards,” Mr Ashdown said. 

“Over 97% of ships inspected had no deficiencies, but a range of issues were identified in the remaining cases.”

Out of 853 inspections conducted, the deficiencies found were categorised as follows:

  • malfunction of control unit/circuit: 16%

  • malfunctioned Air Circuit Breaker (ACB): 12%

  • mis-selection of engine starting selection switch mode in emergency generator room: 12%

  • closing quick-closing valve: 22%

  • malfunction of starting arrangement: 14%

  • malfunction of engine: 8%

  • no power supply to the services essential for safety in an emergency: 10%

  • other: 7%

“Based on these findings, the IACS panel set out a number of conclusions and recommendations on inspection and testing procedures, requirements, and crew training for emergency power system tests,” Mr Ashdown said. 

“These will play an important role in ensuring that emergency systems operate as intended, comply with SOLAS requirements, and enhance safety at sea."

Findings followed observations from port state control officers regarding the reliability of “simulated blackout” tests in SOLAS compliance.

"Simulated blackout tests are widely used, but do not test the actual circuit paths required for real blackouts, which gives engineers on board a false sense of readiness of the ship’s emergency systems," the report stated.

The report made several recommendations expected to improve compliance with SOLAS requirements.

The recommendations were:

  • During ISM audits, focus should be on ensuring that a procedure exists in the necessary detail for conducting a controlled blackout test for emergency diesel generators and may pay more attention to whether the testing arrangements and procedures for emergency diesel generators adequately demonstrate the functionality of the emergency power supply system as a whole, including by means of controlled blackout testing where appropriate.

  • IACS will consider a further analysis to clarify the inspection and testing cycles and requirements for high-frequency malfunctional components such as quick-closing valves, control units and starting devices.

  • IACS will consider further studies to standardize the design standards for emergency generator simulation tests to ensure that the design complies with the requirements.

During the 12-month period, emergency power supply inspections were conducted on 36,723 ships. 

No issues were identified in the majority of cases, but a range of deficiencies were found on more than 2% of ships.

Based on an analysis of the data gathered during this inspection campaign, the survey panel reached several conclusions.

Failure points included the closing quick-closing valve, control unit/circuit (PCB/relay), and Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting arrangement. 

These failures indicated industry-wide issues with equipment maintenance, installation quality, or component durability, and directly compromise SOLAS Ch. II-1 Reg. 42/43 compliance for automatic Emergency Power Supply (EPS) activation.

The campaign also identified non-equipment deficiencies, the most notable of which is the lack of controlled blackout test procedures in company and shipboard Safety Management Systems (SMS). This is contrary to SOLAS Ch. II-1 Reg. 42.7/43.7 (periodic full system testing). 

From an operational perspective, the campaign also identified crew unfamiliarity with Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) operation and the mis-selection of starting switch modes. This highlighted the role of human error as a contributor to malfunctions during emergencies, including gaps in crew training, competency, and safety culture.