RECENT reports that Iran has requested Houthis forces to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have once again exposed the fragile security architecture governing critical international maritime chokepoints. For the global shipping industry, marine insurers, and supply chain managers, any threat to this vital arterial waterway, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, presents severe operational, financial, and strategic risks.
Geographically, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait links the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Djibouti, Yemen, and Somalia on one side, and Eritrea, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other. From a public international law standpoint, the Strait falls squarely within the regime of transit passage governed by Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC). Article 37 explicitly secures the right of transit passage for ships engaged in continuous and expeditious navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another.
Unlike territorial waters where a coastal state may temporarily suspend innocent passage under strict security conditions, the regime of transit passage in international straits is ‘non-suspendable’. Article 44 of the LOSC imposes an affirmative duty on States bordering straits:
From a jurisdictional perspective, neither Iran nor the Houthis possess any lawful authority to interfere with navigation in the strait. Iran is not a coastal state bordering Bab el-Mandeb, and the Houthis remain a non-state actor currently subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions. Any attempt by external actors or non-state groups to blockade, impede, or target commercial shipping within the strait constitutes a direct violation of international maritime law.
The critical question now facing the maritime sector is whether the coastal states bordering Bab el-Mandeb will take active legal and operational measures to safeguard the transit passage.
Turning a blind eye to militant activities or non-state interference within their jurisdictional waters could place these coastal states in direct breach of their international obligations under Article 44 of the LOSC. Failure to warn navigation of known dangers or failing to prevent third-party disruptions impairs the freedom of navigation that underpins international trade.
For commercial shipowners, charterers, and war risk insurers, the willingness and capacity of coastal States to uphold Article 44 of the LOSC directly impact maritime risk assessments. If transit passage cannot be guaranteed by coastal authorities, shipping lines will continue to face exorbitant war risk premiums or be forced into costly rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant transit times and operational expenditures.
Ultimately, preserving the freedom of navigation through Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a political preference; it is a binding mandate under the LOSC. The enforcement of these obligations by strait-bordering States remains essential to restoring commercial confidence and maintaining stability along one of the world's most indispensable trade corridors.